A full year has gone by after the mayhem and tragedy that shook Mumbai and the entire country last November. Pakistani terrorists, with the help of Indian citizens, were able to hold the city of Mumbai to ransom for three days killing about 200 people and injuring about twice that number. A year from that day, we seem to have done more to forget that fateful day than to make efforts to learn our lessons from it. Perhaps this is in keeping with the typical Indian inclination to forget unfortunate events. However, the fact remains that we shall be far better off if we choose never to forget 26/11, to make it a day of mourning for all those who perished or were crippled by the diabolic attack and to look for honest answers to the numerous questions that we need to ask ourselves as a nation from time to time about tragedies like 26/11.
The first of these questions is: Since nothing has happened in India as a result of cross-border terrorism during the last year, is it just good luck or has the government done something about it? Obviously, the government does get some credit for the country being free of cross-border terrorism, but this is more likely to be the outcome of Pakistan’s own internal problems. The government there is trying very hard to survive just as the jihadis there are fighting for their survival. If India had been free of cross-border terrorism mainly due to our own government’s efforts, there would have been some evidence of our being able to tackle the Maoists as well. Our ability to handle indigenous terrorism does not seem to indicate that the year’s cessation of cross-border terrorism has been entirely due to our initiatives. If anything, what is only too evident is that Pakistan is far from being repentant about what it did a year ago, and is inclined to turn its diplomatic manoeuvres on 26/11 into a grotesque charade. Pakistan still continues on its stubborn paths and the ISI still calls the shots. But there are other equally important questions that we should be raising. Ajmal Kasav has been claiming that he was trained just for three months before being sent out on the Mumbai operation. Our observation is that three months’ training does not produce the kind of shooting skills or the cool nerves that Ajmal displayed during the prolonged operation. He was also trained in capturing and hijacking a boat on the high sea. Three months are certainly not enough to impart skills in all such activities. The Indian government must find out where and how such training is imparted. Then there is the uncomfortable question on the role of the nation’s intelligence network. It is now abundantly clear that the intelligence network had failed last November to keep the Maharashtra government informed well in time to avert the tragedy of 26/11. It was learnt later on that the intelligence agencies even had information from the US about the Pakistani plans to attack Mumbai. Why did they not act on that information right away? Kasav and his group had detailed information about the places they were going to attack. This could not have happened without the active collaboration of Indian nationals right from the docking of the boat to complete information on the three or four centres of operation selected in advance. The crucial question is: Are the Indian security forces as inept today at finding and apprehending the enemies within the country who provide all help to such enemies of the country? Or is the scenario even more sinister? Is it that some of the security forces are in league with these enemies within? Is the situation any better today than it was in November 2008? There has been deplorable weakness in the tone and tenor of Indian diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Given the unrepentant attitude of Pakistan to 26/11 and other facets of bilateral friction, there was need for a dose of coercive diplomacy that has been sadly lacking. Ever since 26/11, Pakistan has been calling the shots and inventing the shortcomings in the Indian charges against the Pakistani terrorists. One typical example of this is Pakistan’s contention that India has no evidence against Hafeez Sayeed. What more evidence is required under the circumstances than that he is the acknowledged founder of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, a terrorist outfit? Was he not held under house arrest by Pakistan as the LeT leader? Then why should any other country have to produce any evidence to the effect that he is a terrorist?
One of the noteworthy things to have happened since 26/11 is the constitution of the national anti-terrorism agency that needs to be supported and strengthened. What is far more important in dealing with terrorist activities is the prevention and pre-empting of terror attacks rather than taking action after the event. India must be able to demonstrate its pro-active capacity to prevent such attacks and to punish the would-be perpetrators of such activities. One aspect of the mindset within our polity that has come in the way of dealing effectively with terrorism is our disinclination to punish the alien terrorist and the Indian traitor who helps him. The classic case is the one of Azmal Guru who is still alive after masterminding the attack on the Indian Parliament which led to several deaths among our patriotic security forces.
Finally, there is the failure of our External Affairs Ministry mandarins to convince the US that in all fairness there has to be stronger arm-twisting of Pakistan if the US honestly expects the world to believe that it is waging a global war against terrorism. Here is a country that has been exporting terrorism to India and is carrying on a proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir for years. And yet the US insists on continuing economic aid to Pakistan despite the well-known fact that much of this aid has been used to arm itself against India and will continue to be so used. THE SENTINEL
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